Beware the SEC’s Creation of ‘Natural Asset’ Companies
Real Clear Markets
Margaret Byfield
To anyone who tracks the efforts of environmentalists, their policies often have an ulterior motive. They neither result in a better society nor do they produce better habitats. Their policy preferences also do not consider how using the land improves the land for man and wildlife. Instead, many environmentalists advocate for policies at the expense of farmers, miners, and others who create usable, tangible, societal benefits from the land. This often leaves observers to wonder: what are environmentalists really after?
The answer is power and money. It turns out, that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are quietly working on a rule that may prove this ulterior motive.
On September 29, the SEC, at the request of the NYSE, proposed a rule that would create an entirely new type of company called a Natural Asset Company (NAC). NACs, according to the Proposed Rule, “hold the rights to ecological performance.” These companies would be given license to control lands, both public and private, and would be required not to conduct any “unsustainable activities, such as mining, that lead to the degradation of the ecosystems.” In effect, this means that these companies would somehow seek to profit off the lands without using the lands. Whatever they do, it must be “sustainable.”
How might a company make control of land profitable while also not using the land? The method is admittedly confusing, perhaps intentionally. They profit from “ecological performance” such as “conservation, restoration, or sustainable management.” These NACs would quantify and monetize these natural outputs (such as air or water). The best comparison would be using the air we breathe as a cryptocurrency of sorts. And, these natural assets that collectively belong to all of us would now belong to corporations run by what many would call environmental special interests.
Another feature of these new companies is that the land belonging to sovereign nations and private landowners alike can be subject to the control of NACs. Sovereign nations, such as the United States Government, can provide their lands to private investors, including those outside the United States. China, for example, may be able to invest in an NAC and effectively be a stakeholder in our national parks. Russia could assume control of lands currently leased to produce oil and place them off limits for future natural resource development.
The Biden administration has already suggested that it would cede this power to the NACs. The Office of Science and Technology Policy has also created a method to track the values of nature and place those so-called natural assets onto the federal balance sheet. It described this effort as “the transition we need for sustainable growth and development, a stable climate, and a healthy planet.” The Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are taking similar steps to facilitate the enrollment of our federal lands into NACs.
Private landowners would, possibly even involuntarily, also be ceding their control of land to NACs, who would in turn require them to use the land in a “sustainable” way. NACs would prevent the productive use of the land, which would hurt the landowners financially, but also reduce the supply of minerals, food, and other goods that come from the land.
Even the traditional methods of regulatory oversight have to change to make NACs possible. Traditional accounting standards would not be used to regulate NACs. Likely, this is because NACs would not withstand scrutiny under generally accepted accounting principles. Rather, a new accounting framework would be created by the Intrinsic Exchange Group (IEG). Not coincidentally, the NYSE is an investor in IEG, and would stand to profit off the IEG’s position as an accounting authority.
This effort would be a huge windfall for the federal government and the NACs. The government would create an entirely new revenue stream that would solely benefit the Davos-type crowd that gives the current administration support. Both Big Government and radical environmentalists stand to benefit.
These efforts intentionally prioritize environmentalism over human flourishing. IEG admits that “producing these essential goods and services and managing resources wisely is as valuable, or perhaps even more valuable, than the food production.”
These gains are far from insignificant. IEG has stated that the NAC economy will be four times larger than today’s entire economy. Handing over the reins of an economy larger than what we have ever known effectively hands over power that large as well.
Power and money. If this Proposed Rule is finalized, private investors who have neither America’s best interests nor the public’s economic well-being in mind, would be handed both. They would control our lands and profit from them at the same time. Handing rights to America’s greatest national treasures – along with the air we breathe – to wealthy special interests may seem like an extravagantly bizarre idea, but we’re now less than 45 days until it could be our reality.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS SUBVERTED TO THE NATIONAL DEBT
a must read
An enormous amount of sophisticated planning and implementation
was sustained over decades with the purpose of subverting property
rights in just this way. It began in the United States by amending
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in all 50 states. While this required
many years of effort, it could be done quietly, without an act of
Congress.
The greatest subjugation in world history will have been made possible
by the invention of a construct; a subterfuge; a lie: the “Security
Entitlement.”
Since their beginnings more than four centuries ago, tradable financial
instruments were recognized under law everywhere as personal property
(perhaps that is why they were called “securities”). It may come as
a shock to you that this is no longer the case. “Never attempt to win by force
what can be won by deception.”
Niccolo Machiavelli
These are the key facts:SECURITIY ENTITLEMENTS
# Ownership of securities as property has been replaced with a new
legal concept of a “security entitlement”, which is a contractual
claim assuring a very weak position if the account provider becomes
insolvent.
# All securities are held in un-segregated pooled form. Securities
used as collateral, and those restricted from such use, are held in
the same pool.
# All account holders, including those who have prohibited use of
their securities as collateral, must, by law, receive only a pro-rata
share of residual assets.
# “Re-vindication,” i.e. the taking back of one’s own securities in the
event of insolvency, is absolutely prohibited.
# Account providers may legally borrow pooled securities to collateralize
proprietary trading and financing.
# “Safe Harbor” assures secured creditors priority claim to pooled
securities ahead of account holders.
# The absolute priority claim of secured creditors to pooled client
securities has been upheld by the courts.
Account providers are legally empowered to “borrow” pooled securities,
without restriction. This is called “self help.” As we will see, the
objective is to utilize all securities as collateral.
I assure you that this is not conjecture. You would be greatly mistaken
in dismissing this as “conspiracy theory”, which is a common reaction
to so much unpleasantness. It is possible to really know about this.
The documentation is absolutely irrefutable.
# All securities are held in un-segregated pooled form. Securities
used as collateral, and those restricted from such use, are held in
the same pool.
# All account holders, including those who have prohibited use of
their securities as collateral, must, by law, receive only a pro-rata
share of residual assets.
# “Re-vindication,” i.e. the taking back of one’s own securities in the
event of insolvency, is absolutely prohibited.
# Account providers may legally borrow pooled securities to collateralize
proprietary trading and financing.
# “Safe Harbor” assures secured creditors priority claim to pooled
securities ahead of account holders.
# The absolute priority claim of secured creditors to pooled client
securities has been upheld by the courts.
Account providers are legally empowered to “borrow” pooled securities,
without restriction. This is called “self help.” As we will see, the
objective is to utilize all securities as collateral.
I assure you that this is not conjecture. You would be greatly mistaken
in dismissing this as “conspiracy theory”, which is a common reaction
to so much unpleasantness. It is possible to really know about this.
The documentation is absolutely irrefutable.
to tell them exactly how to do it [5]. The following are excerpts from
that response, which is also included in full in this book’s appendix:
Q (E.U.): In respect of what legal system are the following answers
given?
A (N.Y. Fed): This response confines itself to U.S. commercial law,
primarily Article 8 . . . and parts of Article 9, of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) . . . The subject matter of Article
8 is ‘Investment Securities’ and the subject of Article 9 is
‘Secured Transactions.’ Article 8 and Article 9 have been
adopted throughout the United States.
Q (E.U.): Where securities are held in pooled form (e.g. a collective
securities position, rather than segregated individual positions
per person), does the investor have rights attaching to
particular securities in the pool?
A (N.Y. Fed): No. The security entitlement holder . . . has a pro
rata share of the interests in the financial asset held by
its securities intermediary . . . This is true even if investor
positions are ‘segregated.’
selah
Q (E.U.): Is the investor protected against the insolvency of an
intermediary and, if so, how?
A (N.Y. Fed): . . . an investor is always vulnerable to a securities
intermediary that does not itself have interests in a financial
asset sufficient to cover all of the securities entitlements that
it has created in that financial asset . . .
If the secured creditor has “control” over the financial asset
it will have priority over entitlement holders . . .
If the securities intermediary is a clearing corporation, the
claims of its creditors have priority over the claims of entitlement
holders.
Q (E.U.): What rules protect a transferee acting in good faith?
A (N.Y. Fed): Article 8 protects a purchaser of a financial asset
against claims of an entitlement holder to a property interest
in that financial asset, by limiting the entitlement holder’s
ability to enforce that claim . . . Essentially, unless the purchaser
was involved in the wrongdoing of the securities in termediary, an entitlement holder will be precluded from
raising a claim against it.
Q (E.U.): How are shortfalls [i.e. the intermediary’s position with
an upper-tier intermediary is less than the aggregate recorded
position of the intermediary’s account-holders] handled in
practice?
A (N.Y. Fed): . . . The only rule in such instances is that the security
entitlement holders simply share pro rata in the interests
held by the securities intermediary . . .
In actual fact, shortfalls occur frequently due to fails and for
other reasons, but are of no general consequence except in
the case of the securities intermediary’s insolvency.
Q (E.U.): Does the treatment of shortfalls differ according to
whether there is (i) no fault on the part of the intermediary,
(ii) if fault, fraud or (iv) if fault, negligence or similar
breach of duty?
A (N.Y. Fed): In terms of the interest that the entitlement holders
have in the financial assets credited to its securities account:
regardless of fault, fraud, or negligence of the securities
intermediary, under Article 8, the entitlement holder has
only a pro rata share in the securities intermediary’s interest in the financial asset in
question
That’s how it works directly from “the horse’s mouth”, i.e., the most
authoritative source possible—lawyers working for the Fed.
Further exposure of the purpose of the invention of the security entitlement
can be found in a discussion paper concerning “legislation
on legal certainty of securities holding and dispositions”, prepared by
the European Commission’s Directorate General Internal Market and
Services in 2012 [6]:
Where securities are concerned, the standard has always been
that a custodian has to hold sufficient securities in order to meet
all its clients’ claims. In most EU jurisdictions, such a standard is
guaranteed by giving investors ownership rights towards securities
SELAH SECURITY ENTITEMENTS
Some markets, however, treat securities like money. The US and
Canada based their law on the concept that investors do not own
’securities’, but they own ’securities entitlements’ against their
account providers instead.
The advantage of this concept is the potential increase in the
amount of assets available as collateral, but critics view it as a
threat to stability of the system, because the assets concerned are
based on the same underlying resource.
Concern has been voiced by market participants, regulators, central
banks, and international institutions about potential collateral
shortages . . . There is pressure to broaden the range of securities
eligible as collateral.
As a result of the demand for collateral, securities are increasingly
regarded by market participants as a funding tool. These trends
reinforce the market trends to treat securities like money . . . with
significant implications for ownership.
The risk of unauthorised use of clients’ assets is increased by the
employment of omnibus account structures. Omnibus accounts
pool assets so that individual securities cannot be identified against
specific investors.
This works well until a bankruptcy occurs. If the account provider
defaults, a client with a mere contractual claim becomes an unsecured
creditor, meaning the client’s assets are, as a rule, tied in
the insolvency estate and it is obliged to line up with all the other
unsecured creditors to receive its assets back. . . .
[R]e-use of security interest collateral carries greater risk to the
financial system because multiple counterparties may compete
for the same collateral in default (so called ’priority contests’).
Clearly, the European Union Directorate General Internal Market and
Services, fully knew the above in 2012.
In the next global financial panic, what are the chances that there will
be much of anything remaining in these pools of securities after the
secured creditors have helped themselves?
“In order to improve the legal certainty of financial collateral arrangements,
Member States should ensue that certain provisions
of insolvency law do not apply to such arrangements, in particular,
those that would inhibit the effective realization of financial
collateral . . .”
*This quote was taken from Prof. Guttman’s faculty profile page at American University
at the time. The page still exists, but its content has since been removed.
Essentially all securities “owned” by the public in custodial accounts,
pension plans and investment funds are now encumbered as collateral
underpinning the derivatives complex, which is so large—an order
of magnitude greater than the entire global economy—that there is
not enough of anything in the world to back it. The illusion of collateral
backing is facilitated by a daisy chain of hypothecation and
re-hypothecation in which the same underlying client collateral is reused
many times over by a series of secured creditors. And so it is
these creditors, who understand this system, who have demanded even
more access to client assets as collateral.
Once upon a time, Finland and Sweden had legal systems and national
registries of securities ownership, which assured owners that their
securities could not be used as collateral without express agreement.
It had been possible to own and hold Swedish government bonds, for
example, with absolute certainty that they could not be lost in an
insolvency of a custodian. In 2006, the Legal Certainty group identified
Sweden and Finland as having problematic law.
Thus, over a period of six years, property rights to securities in Sweden
and Finland were deliberately subverted. These countries went from
having the strongest property rights to securities to having no property
rights to securities beyond an artificial appearance of ownership.
In 2014, coincident with the EU directive on central securities depositories,
shocking changes were made to Swedish law. Very few know
about this, other than the people who did it.
They have already “legally” committed everything we own to the national debt, including our sweat. Get the free pdf of The Great Taking by Webb 2022
PROPERTY RIGHTS
An enormous amount of sophisticated planning and implementation
was sustained over decades with the purpose of subverting property
rights in just this way. It began in the United States by amending
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in all 50 states. While this required
many years of effort, it could be done quietly, without an act of
Congress.
The greatest subjugation in world history will have been made possible
by the invention of a construct; a subterfuge; a lie: the “Security
Entitlement.”
Since their beginnings more than four centuries ago, tradable financial
instruments were recognized under law everywhere as personal property
(perhaps that is why they were called “securities”). It may come as
a shock to you that this is no longer the case. “Never attempt to win by force
what can be won by deception.”
Niccolo Machiavelli
These are the key facts:SECURITIY ENTITLEMENTS
# Ownership of securities as property has been replaced with a new
legal concept of a “security entitlement”, which is a contractual
claim assuring a very weak position if the account provider becomes
insolvent.
# All securities are held in un-segregated pooled form. Securities
used as collateral, and those restricted from such use, are held in
the same pool.
# All account holders, including those who have prohibited use of
their securities as collateral, must, by law, receive only a pro-rata
share of residual assets.
# “Re-vindication,” i.e. the taking back of one’s own securities in the
event of insolvency, is absolutely prohibited.
# Account providers may legally borrow pooled securities to collateralize
proprietary trading and financing.
# “Safe Harbor” assures secured creditors priority claim to pooled
securities ahead of account holders.
# The absolute priority claim of secured creditors to pooled client
securities has been upheld by the courts.
Account providers are legally empowered to “borrow” pooled securities,
without restriction. This is called “self help.” As we will see, the
objective is to utilize all securities as collateral.
I assure you that this is not conjecture. You would be greatly mistaken
in dismissing this as “conspiracy theory”, which is a common reaction
to so much unpleasantness. It is possible to really know about this.
The documentation is absolutely irrefutable.
# All securities are held in un-segregated pooled form. Securities
used as collateral, and those restricted from such use, are held in
the same pool.
# All account holders, including those who have prohibited use of
their securities as collateral, must, by law, receive only a pro-rata
share of residual assets.
# “Re-vindication,” i.e. the taking back of one’s own securities in the
event of insolvency, is absolutely prohibited.
# Account providers may legally borrow pooled securities to collateralize
proprietary trading and financing.
# “Safe Harbor” assures secured creditors priority claim to pooled
securities ahead of account holders.
# The absolute priority claim of secured creditors to pooled client
securities has been upheld by the courts.
Account providers are legally empowered to “borrow” pooled securities,
without restriction. This is called “self help.” As we will see, the
objective is to utilize all securities as collateral.
I assure you that this is not conjecture. You would be greatly mistaken
in dismissing this as “conspiracy theory”, which is a common reaction
to so much unpleasantness. It is possible to really know about this.
The documentation is absolutely irrefutable.
to tell them exactly how to do it [5]. The following are excerpts from
that response, which is also included in full in this book’s appendix:
Q (E.U.): In respect of what legal system are the following answers
given?
A (N.Y. Fed): This response confines itself to U.S. commercial law,
primarily Article 8 . . . and parts of Article 9, of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) . . . The subject matter of Article
8 is ‘Investment Securities’ and the subject of Article 9 is
‘Secured Transactions.’ Article 8 and Article 9 have been
adopted throughout the United States.
Q (E.U.): Where securities are held in pooled form (e.g. a collective
securities position, rather than segregated individual positions
per person), does the investor have rights attaching to
particular securities in the pool?
A (N.Y. Fed): No. The security entitlement holder . . . has a pro
rata share of the interests in the financial asset held by
its securities intermediary . . . This is true even if investor
positions are ‘segregated.’
selah
Q (E.U.): Is the investor protected against the insolvency of an
intermediary and, if so, how?
A (N.Y. Fed): . . . an investor is always vulnerable to a securities
intermediary that does not itself have interests in a financial
asset sufficient to cover all of the securities entitlements that
it has created in that financial asset . . .
If the secured creditor has “control” over the financial asset
it will have priority over entitlement holders . . .
If the securities intermediary is a clearing corporation, the
claims of its creditors have priority over the claims of entitlement
holders.
Q (E.U.): What rules protect a transferee acting in good faith?
A (N.Y. Fed): Article 8 protects a purchaser of a financial asset
against claims of an entitlement holder to a property interest
in that financial asset, by limiting the entitlement holder’s
ability to enforce that claim . . . Essentially, unless the purchaser
was involved in the wrongdoing of the securities in termediary, an entitlement holder will be precluded from
raising a claim against it.
Q (E.U.): How are shortfalls [i.e. the intermediary’s position with
an upper-tier intermediary is less than the aggregate recorded
position of the intermediary’s account-holders] handled in
practice?
A (N.Y. Fed): . . . The only rule in such instances is that the security
entitlement holders simply share pro rata in the interests
held by the securities intermediary . . .
In actual fact, shortfalls occur frequently due to fails and for
other reasons, but are of no general consequence except in
the case of the securities intermediary’s insolvency.
Q (E.U.): Does the treatment of shortfalls differ according to
whether there is (i) no fault on the part of the intermediary,
(ii) if fault, fraud or (iv) if fault, negligence or similar
breach of duty?
A (N.Y. Fed): In terms of the interest that the entitlement holders
have in the financial assets credited to its securities account:
regardless of fault, fraud, or negligence of the securities
intermediary, under Article 8, the entitlement holder has
only a pro rata share in the securities intermediary’s interest in the financial asset in
question
That’s how it works directly from “the horse’s mouth”, i.e., the most
authoritative source possible—lawyers working for the Fed.
Further exposure of the purpose of the invention of the security entitlement
can be found in a discussion paper concerning “legislation
on legal certainty of securities holding and dispositions”, prepared by
the European Commission’s Directorate General Internal Market and
Services in 2012 [6]:
Where securities are concerned, the standard has always been
that a custodian has to hold sufficient securities in order to meet
all its clients’ claims. In most EU jurisdictions, such a standard is
guaranteed by giving investors ownership rights towards securities
SELAH SECURITY ENTITEMENTS
Some markets, however, treat securities like money. The US and
Canada based their law on the concept that investors do not own
’securities’, but they own ’securities entitlements’ against their
account providers instead.
The advantage of this concept is the potential increase in the
amount of assets available as collateral, but critics view it as a
threat to stability of the system, because the assets concerned are
based on the same underlying resource.
Concern has been voiced by market participants, regulators, central
banks, and international institutions about potential collateral
shortages . . . There is pressure to broaden the range of securities
eligible as collateral.
As a result of the demand for collateral, securities are increasingly
regarded by market participants as a funding tool. These trends
reinforce the market trends to treat securities like money . . . with
significant implications for ownership.
The risk of unauthorised use of clients’ assets is increased by the
employment of omnibus account structures. Omnibus accounts
pool assets so that individual securities cannot be identified against
specific investors.
This works well until a bankruptcy occurs. If the account provider
defaults, a client with a mere contractual claim becomes an unsecured
creditor, meaning the client’s assets are, as a rule, tied in
the insolvency estate and it is obliged to line up with all the other
unsecured creditors to receive its assets back. . . .
[R]e-use of security interest collateral carries greater risk to the
financial system because multiple counterparties may compete
for the same collateral in default (so called ’priority contests’).
Clearly, the European Union Directorate General Internal Market and
Services, fully knew the above in 2012.
In the next global financial panic, what are the chances that there will
be much of anything remaining in these pools of securities after the
secured creditors have helped themselves?
“In order to improve the legal certainty of financial collateral arrangements,
Member States should ensue that certain provisions
of insolvency law do not apply to such arrangements, in particular,
those that would inhibit the effective realization of financial
collateral . . .”
*This quote was taken from Prof. Guttman’s faculty profile page at American University
at the time. The page still exists, but its content has since been removed.
Essentially all securities “owned” by the public in custodial accounts,
pension plans and investment funds are now encumbered as collateral
underpinning the derivatives complex, which is so large—an order
of magnitude greater than the entire global economy—that there is
not enough of anything in the world to back it. The illusion of collateral
backing is facilitated by a daisy chain of hypothecation and
re-hypothecation in which the same underlying client collateral is reused
many times over by a series of secured creditors. And so it is
these creditors, who understand this system, who have demanded even
more access to client assets as collateral.
Once upon a time, Finland and Sweden had legal systems and national
registries of securities ownership, which assured owners that their
securities could not be used as collateral without express agreement.
It had been possible to own and hold Swedish government bonds, for
example, with absolute certainty that they could not be lost in an
insolvency of a custodian. In 2006, the Legal Certainty group identified
Sweden and Finland as having problematic law.
Thus, over a period of six years, property rights to securities in Sweden
and Finland were deliberately subverted. These countries went from
having the strongest property rights to securities to having no property
rights to securities beyond an artificial appearance of ownership.
In 2014, coincident with the EU directive on central securities depositories,
shocking changes were made to Swedish law. Very few know
about this, other than the people who did it.