Is the Nature Conservancy in bed with the CCP?
The letter raises concerns about The Nature Conservancy, a key REPI partner involved in 34 buffer projects, citing its connections to the CCP through employees who have held positions in Chinese government bodies and contributed to state-run media.
April 17, 2025
The Honorable Pete Hegseth Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301 Dear Secretary Hegseth:
As part of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s investigation into “the regulatory costs, bad policies, and veiled special interests that defined the Biden Administration,” the Committee is examining the Biden-era Department of Defense’s (Department) Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration Program (REPI). Specifically, the Committee is investigating the Biden Administration’s use of REPI to facilitate the sale of land easements adjacent to military bases to nonprofits with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the pretense of conservation.
REPI is designed as a “tool for combatting encroachment that can limit or restrict military training, testing, and operations.” A key component of the program is the use of partnerships among “military services, private conservation groups, and state and local governments” to share the cost of easements and land near military bases. However, over the years, multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports highlighted the Department’s shortcomings in adequately assessing the risks of foreign encroachment on federal lands. Further, the Committee is aware of reports indicating that some REPI partners may have affiliations or business operations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that merit closer examination given the risk posed by the CCP.
REPI typically enables the Department to partner with private organizations to purchase easements—legal agreements restricting land use around military bases. These efforts are known as “buffer projects” and may take conservation into consideration in order to preserve habitats and land. However, reports indicate The Nature Conservancy, a REPI partner involved in 34 buffer projects, has ties to the CCP. Additionally, employees of The Nature Conservancy’s China Program have held positions within the CCP, including roles at the Chinese People’s Political Consultive Conference, the United Front Working Department, China’s State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. In addition, these employees have contributed articles to the state-run publication People’s Daily.
CCP influence campaigns seek to “advance China’s international ambitions through non- state channels, focusing on subnational foreign governments, political figures, and non- governmental organizations…” This effort is part of United Front work, “a strategy through which the CCP seeks to influence the political climate at large.” The Committee also found that two additional organizations listed as partners on the Department’s REPI website—Rio Tinto and Rayonier—appear to have offices in the PRC or have worked with organizations affiliated with the CCP. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center cautioned U.S. businesses with a presence in the PRC that the CCP has legal grounds for “accessing and controlling data held by U.S. firms in China… the laws may also compel locally employed PRC nationals of U.S. firms to assist in PRC intelligence efforts.” These REPI partnerships are particularly worrying given the proximity of projects to military installations. CCP access to buffer projects could pose great risk to U.S. military installations and attempts to breach U.S. installations are not without precedent.
A 2014 GAO report concluded that “DOD has not conducted a risk assessment…assessing the degree to which foreign encroachment could pose a threat to the mission of the ranges.” Two years later, a subsequent GAO report found that the Department “made limited progress in assessing foreign encroachment on federally managed land” including near military installations. While existing GAO reports do not explicitly identify the REPI program as a potential security risk, the Department’s historical challenges in accurately evaluating these threats raise concerns about the program’s vulnerability.
In light of these concerns, the Committee requests a staff-level briefing on security risks and mitigation for REPI partnerships. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X. To schedule the briefing, please contact Committee on Oversight and Government Reform staff at (202) 225-5074. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.
Sincerely,
James Comer Chairman
